Alex Williams

In order to analyze how these shortages resolve themselves we have been tracking reported shortages and comparing them to indices of industrial production and prices faced by producers.

How do we evaluate model choice under uncertainty as data points are still coming in? If one model implies prescriptions with direct, catastrophic welfare costs that are empirically difficult to reverse, should the consequences affect how much weight we give the model?

Wage growth is slowing. Job openings are increasing, unemployment is holding, and wage growth is slowing. This was supposed to be impossible–so what does it mean that it’s happening?

The Fed is worried that inflation will continue until wage growth comes down or unemployment ticks up based on the continued strength in “Core PCE Services ex-Housing”. But the Fed is wrong to be so confident.

A soft landing consensus for CPI? The forecasting consensus is sticking close to its November predictions, with a 0.3% increase expected for core CPI (falling from 6% to 5.7% year-over-year) and -0.1% for headline CPI (falling from 7.1% to 6.5% year-over-year) for December. A print

Though they may proclaim otherwise, the Fed is aiming for a recessionary labor market. They might not succeed, they might change their minds, but buried in the Fed’s latest projections is a definite–albeit obscured–statement of intent.

Energy price volatility, which may be with us for quite some time as we pursue decarbonization, is one of our nation’s greatest macroeconomic threats.

Market rents are decelerating, which means CPI-measured rents – and with them, core and headline CPI – should ultimately decelerate as well, with a lag. But is this deceleration due to the Fed’s actions? Or is it because job growth is slowing down endogenously, as many have been expecting over this